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This article examines the effect of restrictive smoking laws on restaurants, bars, and
taverns. Supporters of these laws often argue that they do not harm ﬁrms and may
even raise proﬁts. Opponents argue that owners cater to customer smoking preferences,
and laws mandating speciﬁc policies will negatively impact proﬁts. This article provides
a framework for examining the distribution of effects that smoking laws exert on busi
nesses, and demonstrates that changes in total sales or tax revenues do not provide a
meaningful understanding of the economic implications because smoking laws exert dif
ferent effects on different ﬁrms. The distribution of these effects is examined using data
from a nationwide survey of 1,300 restaurant, bar, and tavern owners. While some sub
sets of ﬁrms are predicted to suffer revenue declines, bars are predicted to be more than
twice as likely to experience losses as restaurants. An important implication is that the
increasing level of governmental restrictions on smoking in the hospitality sector could
gradually impact the types of service available to the public.
I. INTRODUCTION

Laws restricting smoking in restaurants
have been enacted in 32 states.1 Support
ers argue that these laws do not harm ﬁrms
and may even raise their proﬁts. Recent
studies ﬁnd that bans on smoking in eating
and drinking places have not impacted the
proﬁtability of these establishments, sug
gesting that smoking bans either do not
reduce demand or offset sales losses by
lowering costs. Opponents of smoking restric
tions argue that some owners would ﬁnd
it proﬁtable to allow smoking throughout
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1. Smoking laws have been imposed on restau
rants in Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, and Wisconsin.

their establishments, others to forbid all
smoking, and still others to accommodate
both smokers and nonsmokers by creating
separate areas or investing in partitions,
smoking patios or rooms, and air ﬁltration
systems.
Little economic research has been pub
lished on the effects of smoking laws on the
proﬁtability of restaurants, bars, and taverns,
and almost none has been directed toward
the issue of how these laws may exert dif
ferential effects on businesses. This article
provides a framework for examining how
smoking laws impact establishments based on
a number of business attributes. Hypothe
ses regarding the effect of smoking laws are
tested using data from a nationwide survey of
1,300 restaurant and bar owners. The empiri
cal evidence indicates that smoking laws exert
differential effects on businesses.

II. CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON
SMOKING LAWS

A. Studies Conclude That Smoking Laws
Do Not Harm Firms
While a full examination of the welfare
effects of smoking laws must consider all
members of society, our literature review
focuses on the economic effects of smoking

laws on the owners of ﬁrms.2 Three published
studies have concluded that businesses do not
suffer reduced sales as a result of bans. Glantz
and Smith (1994) compare 15 cities with
smoking laws with 15 matched control group
cities. They conclude that “legislators and
government ofﬁcials can enact such health
and safety requirements to protect patrons
and employees in restaurants from the tox
ins in second-hand tobacco smoke without
the fear of adverse economic consequences”
(p. 1085). In their study of smoking laws in
North Carolina, Goldstein and Sobel (1998)
conclude: “Even in the number one tobaccoproducing state in the U.S., ETS regulations
present no adverse economic impact, and
there is no need for exceptions to the ordi
nances based on such fears” (p. 286). Sciacca
and Ratliff (1998) conclude in their study of
Arizona ﬁrms that “[t]his study seems to indi
cate that prohibiting smoking in all Flagstaff
restaurants has had no effect on total restau
rant sales     If these ﬁndings are true for
communities throughout the United States,
then other cities can enact similar laws, which
protect patrons and food service workers from
tobacco smoke, without concerns that restau
rants will lose business” (p. 184).
B. Previous Studies Cannot Uncover
Differential Effects
These three studies all rely on a methodol
ogy that examines sales tax revenues in cities
that have enacted smoking bans by comparing
them with control cities that have not adopted
such laws. There are serious methodological
problems with this approach.3 One problem
is that gross retail sales or tax revenues are
not useful measures by which to gauge eco
nomic effects on a diverse set of ﬁrms. For
example, on an aggregate basis, ﬁrms subject
to a ban may show no net effect on sales even
though one-half of ﬁrms showed gains and the
other half exhibited losses. It is not particu
larly useful to conclude that nothing occurred.
Evidence of differential effects was uncov
ered by a Peat Marwick (1996) study of the
1995 smoking ban in California restaurants.
2. The impact of smoking laws on consumer and
producer surplus could also be examined; see Becker
and Murphy (1993) and Tremblay and Tremblay (1995).
3. Evan’s (1997) review of Glantz and Smith (1997)
points out numerous statistical ﬂaws and concludes that
ﬁndings of no effects are unwarranted.

Their random survey of 600 owners concluded
that, while 52% lost business, 6% gained busi
ness, and the rest did not know. Of the 37
owners with favorable effects, 32% had out
door seating, and 57% had bar seating—areas
exempted at that time.
The studies that ﬁnd no adverse effects are
unable to detect differential effects because
they aggregate all ﬁrms in a community
together. This approach conveys confusion
about effects exerted on individual ﬁrms. But
an understanding of differential effects is
essential for a comprehensive social welfare
analysis and would be necessary in determin
ing appropriate levels of compensation for
injured parties within the broader framework
of social welfare analysis.
C. Problems with Control Group
Methodology
Comparisons between cities with smok
ing laws and those without reveal effects
from the laws only when studies properly
control for nonban factors that affect sales.
Previous studies match cities on the basis
of population density and size and median
income. However, it is unclear whether these
factors control for differences in tourism,
weather, tax rates, and employment growth,
all of which could also inﬂuence businesses.4
Moreover, studies compare ratios of restau
rant/bar sales to total sales to examine eco
nomic effects of laws on ﬁrms. Glantz and
Smith (1994), for example, state that, “If an
ordinance adversely affected restaurants, this
fraction would be expected to drop when the
ordinance was in force” (p. 1088). However,
when nonban factors are not controlled for,
this ratio cannot reveal independent effects
of laws on ﬁrms.
D. Samples Are Not Random
Previous studies have not used random
samples. For example, Glantz and Smith
(1984) chose “the ﬁrst 15 US cities to enact
smoke-free ordinances affecting restaurants”
(p. 1087). This sampling poses a problem
because these locations have relatively few
smokers since otherwise they would probably
4. Glantz and Smith (1994) selected control cities
that did not mandate smoking bans; however, Evans
(1997) found that more than half were misclassiﬁed.

not be ﬁrst to legislate bans. A sample selec
tivity bias arises because such locations would
tend to experience relatively little harm from
bans.5 Moreover, local legislators are likely to
be optimistic about local economic conditions
since they are unlikely to promote laws that
jeopardize tax revenues. The authors then
appear to have handpicked locations where
economic downturns in the restaurant and bar
sectors are unlikely following passage of bans.
Empirical results are then subject to two
selection biases. First, authors have “cherry
picked” samples that will exhibit relatively
few adverse effects from laws. Second, sam
pling calls into question conclusions that
adoption of similar laws to other locations
will yield similar effects. Cities with laws and
those without (control groups) are dissimilar
when it comes to smoking issues, and it is
unlikely that adoption of bans to other cities
would go as smoothly as in cities that were
ﬁrst to adopt them.
E. Smoking Bans Are Not Uniformly
Enforced
Smoking bans are not always fully
enforced. In California, for example,
widespread civil disobedience appears com
mon (Blankstein, 1998; Canto, 1998). This
indicates that some percentage of ﬁrms would
be adversely affected by full compliance—
thus validating claims that smoking bans
adversely affect some ﬁrms. Noncomplying
ﬁrms would also tend to suffer greater effects
from fuller compliance. Differences in com
pliance rates compound the problem of mak
ing predictions about how other locations
might be impacted.
F. Studies Focus on Revenues, Not Proﬁt
Owners may attempt to overcome lost
business by raising prices or lowering product
quality. Owners may also increase advertising
or provide promotions that add to costs. If so,
proﬁts will change. Previous studies examine
only revenues, which do not indicate proﬁts.
5. Dunham and Marlow (2000) argue that, while
restaurants that operate in states that have enacted
smoking restrictions also tend to offer a larger share
of their seating to nonsmoking use, this has little to do
with presence of a smoking law. Rather, their customers
simply have stronger preferences for such seating.

G. Summary
Previous studies offer little information
about the economic effects of bans on restau
rants and bars. Sample selection bias and a
statistical methodology based on community
averages and control group comparisons do
not clearly isolate economic effects. No infor
mation on how such effects differ between
establishments is reported. Many nonban fac
tors that affect revenues are not properly
controlled for, leading to serious questions
about whether studies tell us much about
the effects of smoking laws on ﬁrms. Imper
fect enforcement and sample selection prob
lems suggest problems with predictions of
how laws would affect other cities. Finally,
studies focus on revenues, whereas proﬁts are
the more useful indicator of economic effects
on ﬁrms.
It is also important to realize that ﬁnd
ings of no negative effects on revenues in the
aggregate could be consistent with a state in
which ﬁrms have not reached an optimal mix
of smoking and nonsmoking seating. How
ever, this situation does not necessarily mean
that banning smoking is efﬁcient because
changes in community attitudes would most
likely lead to seating changes by ﬁrms that
are more optimal than from government reg
ulation. No adverse revenue effects does not
necessarily mean that future revenues would
not be lower than they would otherwise have
been as ﬁrms adapt to changes in smoking
preferences. However, lack of adverse effects
may simply be a result of serious statistical
ﬂaws in previous studies.
III. AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF SMOKING LAWS

Coase (1960) provides a general frame
work for how ﬁrms efﬁciently deal with the
smoking issue in the hospitality industry, and
demonstrates that private markets internal
ize externalities when there are trivial trans
action costs and property rights are clearly
assigned.6 Although this study does not focus
on the externality issue per se, applica
tion of the Coase theorem has important
implications about how owners allocate air
space within establishments and therefore
how smoking laws will affect proﬁts.7
6. See Boyes and Marlow (1996) for a more detailed
discussion.
7. Ban proponents argue that taxpayers subsidize
higher health care costs of smokers. However, Lee

Although the air space is commonly
viewed as a public domain resource, this is
untrue within the conﬁnes of private ﬁrms.
Whether an owner caters solely to smok
ers or to nonsmokers, or accommodates
both, depends on customer preferences and
marginal costs of accommodation.8
Transaction costs are not prohibitive
because owners act as intermediaries between
smoking and nonsmoking customers. Negoti
ation occurs via owners who determine what
air space allocation is consistent with max
imum proﬁts, and in this way, private mar
kets tend toward internalization of externali
ties. Incorrect decisions displease patrons and
lower proﬁts.
Smoking regulations shift ownership of the
air space from restaurant and bar propri
etors to individuals who prefer that restric
tions take place. Options facing customers
may change, and smoking customers may
choose to spend more time at home rather
than going out, while nonsmokers may spend
more time at ﬁrms when they believe that
laws improved environments.9
Supply-side effects arise when laws change
cost by requiring that ﬁrms expend more
resources accommodating nonsmokers. In
the hospitality industry, proﬁts are deter
mined in a relatively free market, with a large
number of suppliers and customers.10 Own
ers determine levels of different attributes,
including price, quality, quantity, cuisine, and
smoking accommodation to maximize prof
its. It is an empirical question as to how
proﬁts will change following smoking laws.
A testable hypothesis is then that restrictions
exert differential effects on proﬁts. Effects
should also vary between restaurant and bar
industries, simply because of differences in
(1991) suggests that bans do not correct this problem,
while Allen (1992) argues that society has a right to limit
these external costs by imposing bans. See also Gravelle
and Zimmerman (1994), who argue that passive smoke
risk has been overestimated by OSHA.
8. The importance of accommodating nonsmokers is
evident in industry trade magazines. See for example,
Walter (1994) and Fruchtman (1992).
9. Corsun et al. (1996) found that smokers dined out
less frequently following New York City’s ban of 1995.
On average, smokers outspent nonsmokers by $21.58 per
week.
10. Restaurant and bar markets are not perfectly
competitive because products are not homogeneous;
however, because of ease of entry, proﬁts might go to
normal in the long run.

customer bases and marginal costs of accom
modation. Another testable hypothesis is that
adverse effects are higher for ﬁrms catering
to relatively many smokers, as ﬁrms with few
smokers have already found it proﬁtable to
voluntarily meet regulations.
IV. DESCRIPTION OF DATA

Survey data collected by Roper Starch
for the National Licensed Beverage Asso
ciation was used to examine how smoking
laws inﬂuence ﬁrms. The telephone survey
was conducted during the period of Septem
ber 5–12, 1996. The sample consisted of
owners/managers of 650 restaurants and 650
bars/taverns across the United States. Sam
ples were drawn in a statistically random
manner from national lists provided by Sur
vey Sampling, Inc., and are applicable to all
such establishments with a maximum sam
pling error of approximately ±4 percent
age points. The survey instrument includes
questions pertaining to seating allocations,
attitudes toward smoking laws, strategies to
deal with smoking/nonsmoking customers,
revenues, and projections of effects of smok
ing laws on revenues. The sample is divided
into states with and without smoking laws,
using the classiﬁcation system of the Center
for Disease Control that deﬁnes smoking laws
as laws allowing or requiring nonsmoking sec
tions in restaurants.11
This sample provides many advantages
over those used in previous studies. This study
uses ﬁrm-level data, facilitating the analysis of
distributional impacts. This is a random sam
ple and does not suffer from selectivity bias
problems. The random nature of the selec
tion process also minimizes potential for bias
relating to imperfect compliance issues. This
sample does not choose ﬁrms on the basis
of whether they operate under smoking laws,
and questions were posed to owners under
the assumption of full enforcement. But, as
with previous studies, this data set focuses on
revenues. An examination of proﬁts would be
preferable, but we know of no data that con
nect proﬁts with smoking laws. However, the
11. Local communities may also impose laws, but
these are not included here because we do not know
exact locations of ﬁrms. However, local laws are less
common in states without smoking laws—thus the state
measure provides a good measure of restrictions faced
by businesses.

TABLE 1
Expected Revenue Changes
All Firms
Percentage of Restaurants
Higher
6%
Revenues
Lower
39
Revenues
No Change
51
Don’t Know
4
Observations
650
Percentage of Bars and Taverns
Higher
2%
Revenues
Lower
83
Revenues
No Change
13
Don’t Know
2
Observations
650

Smoking
Law
6%

No
Law
6%

38

42

51
5
444

49
3
206

2%

1%

85

75

11
2
524

18
6
126

focus on revenues allows for the direct com
parison with results from previous studies. It
is also important to note that economists tend
to be suspicious of survey data asking about
probable effects. We attempt to overcome this
problem by comparing responses of owners
who have already been subject to smoking
restrictions with those who have not, and we
are inclined to rely more heavily on responses
by ﬁrms that already have experienced smok
ing restrictions.
V. DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC EFFECTS

Owners were asked how revenues would
change following laws requiring that all ﬁrms
become virtually nonsmoking. Table 1 displays
expected effects on all restaurants, as well
as broken down into states with and with
out smoking laws. From the entire sample, a
restrictive smoking law is predicted to raise
revenues by 6% of restaurant owners and
lower revenues by 39%. Just over 50% of
owners expected no change, and 4% provided
no prediction.
A 2 test indicates that the pattern of
expected outcomes reported by owners in
smoking law states does not differ signiﬁ
cantly (5% level) from those in no-law states.
Managers with experience of dealing with
laws then offer identical predictions as those
without them. This is interesting because ban
advocates often argue that owners have no

reason to fear economic impacts. But, assur
ances of no effect appear somewhat mis
placed given that 38% of owners that have
already operated under some form of a law
predict that virtual bans lower revenues.
Table 1 also displays expected revenue
changes by owners of bars. From the entire
sample, a ban is predicted to raise revenues
by 2% of owners, lower revenues by 83%, and
produce no change by 13% (2% provided no
prediction). Again, using a 2 test, responses
do not differ signiﬁcantly when broken down
into states with and without laws, thus indi
cating that ﬁrms that have already experi
enced smoking laws offer similar predictions.
A 2 test also indicates that responses
signiﬁcantly differ between restaurant and
bar/tavern owners. Owners of bars and tav
erns are more than twice as likely to predict
decreased revenues, indicating that laws are
expected to impose effects that differ across
industries.
VI. ARE OWNER RESPONSES CONSISTENT
WITH THE ECONOMIC MODEL?

A potential problem with this analysis
stems from the survey nature of the data
and that predictions may not reﬂect actual
events—a problem characteristic of survey
analysis of possible future events. This short
coming is ameliorated to large degree by
determining how responses vary by current
seating allocations. That is, do ﬁrms that pre
dict adverse effects tend to allocate relatively
few seats to nonsmoking use—or cater to
relatively many smokers? If so, those ﬁrms
catering to relatively few smokers and allocat
ing relatively many seats to nonsmoking use
should predict revenue gains or no revenue
effects. Moreover, as discussed above, these
owners may now attract smokers that pre
viously were not pleased with their policies,
and establishments that previously catered to
smokers may now compete with other ﬁrms
on the basis of price or quality.
Only data on restaurants are examined
because of little variation in seating alloca
tions of bars and taverns. Table 2 indicates
that 40 restaurants predicted revenue gains,
254 predicted revenue losses, and 329 pre
dicted no changes.12 Relationships between
12. Twenty seven owners did not know what to pre
dict and have been excluded from this analysis.

predictions and seating allocations are consis
tent with expectations. Firms predicting losses
have relatively low seating allocations to non
smoking use (38%), which strongly indicates
that they cater to large populations of smok
ers. Firms predicting gains report relatively
high seating nonsmoking allocations (70%),
which suggests they expect to attract smokers
who previously did not like their nonsmok
ing policies. Finally, ﬁrms predicting no rev
enue effects have seating allocations (64%)
much higher than those predicting losses, and
slightly below those predicting gains.
Table 2 also displays seating allocations bro
ken down into restaurants that operate in states
with and without smoking laws. Again, under
both conditions, owners predicting revenue
gains or no change tended to allocate relatively
many seats to nonsmoking use, and owners pre
dicting revenue losses tended to allocate rela
tively few seats to nonsmoking use.
In sum, predictions of revenue changes
are consistent with the economic model of
seating allocations and support our empirical
evidence demonstrating that laws exert differ
ential effects.
Potential for bias deserves reiteration.
Owners may oppose smoking laws for per
sonal reasons and, as a result, exaggerate
their expected costs.13 One might imagine that
smokers are interested in serving other smok
ers, and they may exaggerate costs of laws.
However, we have no information on the
likelihood of this event, and know of no data
set that contains actual proﬁt effects and
seating allocations. Moreover, while owners
may have personal views, it remains unclear
whether views regarding smoking would over
ride preferences for maximizing the value
of their ﬁrms. Whether they proﬁt-maximize
or cater to personal preferences regarding
smoking remains an issue for future research.
VII. LOGIT MODEL OF EXPECTED
REVENUE CHANGES

A qualitative choice model estimates the
probability that an owner with a given set of
attributes predicts that bans lower revenues.
The following logit model is estimated.
(1)

changei = f �NSi  chaini  agei 
sizei  bari  lawi �

13. See Berrens et al. (1997) and Kerkvliet (1994)
for concerns with survey data.

where
NSi = percentage of seating allocated
to nonsmoking use,
chaini = 1 if ﬁrm is a member of a
corporate chain and 0 otherwise,
agei = years ﬁrm has been in business,
sizei = number of employees (full-time
and part-time),
bari = 1 if bar/tavern and 0 otherwise,
and
lawi = 1 if state smoking law is present
and 0 otherwise.
The dependent variable changei = 0 if owner
expects either no change or a rise in revenues,
and 1 if revenues are predicted to fall.
The percentage of seating that owners
allocate to nonsmoking use NSi is expected
to exert a negative inﬂuence on the probabil
ity that revenues will fall since this variable
indicates how many nonsmokers are served.
Whether an establishment is a member of
a corporate chain is expected to inﬂuence
responses if chain members offer greater
accommodation of smokers and nonsmokers
as an element of overall corporate strategy.
If true, chain members would be less likely
to predict revenue falls and the expected sign
on chaini is negative.
Years in business, agei , is expected to
positively affect probabilities of revenue
drops. Accommodation costs may be posi
tively related to age of buildings, and older
ﬁrms may accommodate less, given that they
tend to cater to more established and sta
ble customer bases than newer businesses.
Firm size, sizei , is measured as number of
employees and is expected to exert a neg
ative inﬂuence when scale economies exist
in accommodation. For example, larger ﬁrms
may ﬁnd it easier or cheaper to separate
smokers from nonsmokers. A positive sign
is expected on bari following the discussion
that bars/taverns ﬁnd it more costly to sep
arate smokers from nonsmokers and their
customer bases have less preference for non
smoking seating. Table 3 displays logit esti
mations for all ﬁrms, restaurants only, and
bars/taverns samples.
Estimation based on all ﬁrms supports
many of the expectations. Higher shares of
nonsmoking seating lower the probability that

TABLE 2
Percentage of Seating Allocations to Nonsmoking Use by Restaurants
Prediction
All States
Revenue gains
Revenue losses
No changes
Smoking Law States
Revenue gains
Revenue losses
No changes
No-Law States
Revenue gains
Revenue losses
No changes

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Number

70%
38%
64%

95%
33%
75%

38.9
36.1
38.7

40
254
329

72%
41%
68%

100%
45%
85%

39.1
37.1
38.3

27
167
229

66%
31%
56%

80%
25%
60%

39.7
33.6
38.2

13
87
100

TABLE 3
Logit Model of Revenue Change
All Firms
Constant
NS
Chain
Age
Size
Bar
Law
Log Likelihood
Obs with Dep = 0
Obs with Dep = 1
Observations

0.26
1.36
−0.02*
8.11
−0.29***
1.86
0.01**
2.20
0.01
1.58
1.30*
7.69
0.15
0.94
−648.73
465
793
1258

Restaurants

Bars/Taverns

0.33
1.59
−0.02*
7.68
−0.33***
1.72
0.01**
1.95
0.01***
1.80

1.39*
5.35
−0.01***
1.66
−0.25
0.84
0.01
0.96
−.004
0.53

0.03
0.17
−380.88
369
254
623

0.43
1.62
−265.52
96
539
635

Dependent variable = 0 if owner expects no change, or a revenue increase, = 1 if owner expects a revenue decrease.
Asymptotic t statistics are given below estimated coefﬁcients.
∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗
, ,
denote signiﬁcant at .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively.

owners expect adverse revenue effects, chain
members are less likely to expect revenue
reductions, older ﬁrms are more likely to
expect revenue declines, and bar owners are
more likely to expect revenues to fall than
are restaurant owners.14 Firm size and pres
14. Alternative speciﬁcations checked for model sta
bility between small and large establishments, young
and old establishments, and chain versus independent
ﬁrms. In all cases, the percentage of nonsmoking seating
remained signiﬁcant and of the same sign. The smoking
law variable remained insigniﬁcant. The other variables
retained the same properties.

ence of state smoking laws do not signiﬁ
cantly inﬂuence the equation.
Estimation based on only restaurants
supports the same signiﬁcant relationships,
except of course the bari variable has been
removed from the equation. In addition, ﬁrm
size is estimated to exert a weak (.10 level)
positive effect on the probability that an
owner expects a revenue loss.
Estimation based on only bars/taverns
yields just one signiﬁcant factor: the share of
nonsmoking seating exerts a negative effect,

as expected, and is consistent with the other
estimations. This effect is only weakly signif
icant at the .10 level, but estimation results
suggest that most bar/tavern owners expect
that a virtual smoking ban will lower revenues.
VIII. CONCLUSION

This article examines the revenue effects
that smoking laws exert on restaurants, bars,
and taverns as predicted by 1,300 owners of
these ﬁrms. While a subset of ﬁrms is likely
to suffer adverse revenue effects following a
smoking ban, bars and taverns are predicted
to experience adverse effects more than twice
as often as restaurants. This is consistent
with “reality checks” that indicated that rev
enue predictions reﬂect owner perceptions
of customer preferences regarding smoking.
Adverse revenue effects were most often pre
dicted by owners allocating relatively little
seating to nonsmoking use, and positive or
neutral effects were most often predicted by
owners who allocated relatively much of their
seating to nonsmoking use.
The interesting public policy issue con
cerns the distribution of effects, and not the
average effect exerted on a particular indus
try. It is true that 51% of restaurant owners
predicted no revenue changes, but it is inap
propriate to conclude that no effect would be
exerted on this industry since 39% of owners
predicted that revenues would fall following
a virtual smoking ban. Similarly, not all bars
and taverns are predicted to experience iden
tical effects, but the distribution of predicted
effects is much tighter (83% predict revenues
to fall) for this industry.
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